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G.: Damages--Duty to Mitigate
REGCENT CASE COMMENTS
Court here seems to bind the states on an issue of state law which
it has held it could not consider on appeal from the states' courts.
The issue being one of state law,"3 the further question arises of
which state's law is to be applied; certainly the Supreme Court
14
here had to apply a "general" or "federal" common law.
Will this decision be confined to its particular facts, that is,
to cases where the taxes claimed exceed the total value of the decedent's entire estate and where the estate is very large? There
are indications in the language of both the majority and dissenting
opinions that the holding will be so restricted."
J. P. R.
DAMAGES-DUTY TO MiIGAm.-P

reported in September at

the Hamlin grade school where he was to serve under a one-year
contract as principal and learned that, as a part of a wholesale
transfer of teachers in the county, his place of work had been
changed to the Red River school in another district of the same
county at the same salary. P, refusing to comply with the transfer,
remained unemployed as a teacher at day school until March, at
which time he was reemployed at the Hamlin school. In an action
by P against the school board for his contract salary from September until March verdict and judgment were entered for P. On appeal, judgment affirmed. Held, that one need not mitigate damages
arising under a broken contract by accepting similar employment
in a different locality. Martin v. Board of Education of Lincoln
County.'
The general proposition sought to be applied in the principal
case is the well-established one "that it is 'the duty' of a party,
(1918). And judgment on each state's taxes is entitled to full faith and credit.
Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 56 S. Ct. 229, 80 L. Ed. 220

(1935).

13In re Bain's Estate, 104 Misc. 508, 172 N. Y. Supp. 604 (1918);
RESTATEMFT, CONFLICT or LAws (1934) § 10 (1); 1 BEALE, CoNFliCT or

LAws (1935) 105, § 10.1.
14 After Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U. S. 1842), the federal
courts applied in matters of general jurisprudence what was called a general
common law, but they denied that there was any federal common law as a body
of law distinct from the common law of the states. The recent case of Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 134 A. L. R.
1487 (1937), though overruling Swift v. Tyson, maintained still that "There
is no federal general common law."'
sFrom the majority opinion: "Taken as a whole the case is exceptional
in its circumstances and in the principles of law applicable to them . . ."
From the dissenting opinion: "To be sure, the Court's opinion endeavors to
circumscribe carefully the bounds of jurisdiction now exercised."
'199 S. . 887 (W. Va. 1938).
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injured by the breach of his contract, to exercise reasonable diligence to minimize his damages." 2 In establishing such a duty in
the case of a breach of contract of employment, the burden is on
the contract breaker 3 to allege and prove that the plaintiff could
have obtained other employment of a similar nature4 in the same
locality.' As it is set forth in the opinion of the court, the holding
in the principal case rests primarily on the belief that this element
of locality has not been adequately alleged or proved. The soundness of using locality as the sole test seems at least doubtful in light
of the flexibility in the meaning of the word "locality" 6 and the
presence here of proof that the Red River school, though not in
the same district with it, was in the same county as the Hamlin
school, the size and geographic conditions of which county might
7
have been judicially known to the court.
Irrespective of the soundness of this reasoning, there are
other considerations, not articulated by the court, which may have
justly influenced its decision of this problem. One such consideration arises from the fact that had plaintiff accepted the subsequent
similar employment, as it is insisted he should have done, it would
require that he remain in the employ of those who had wronged
him by the breach of their contract. Courts hesitate to impose
such a duty on a party s and consequently are likely rather to
accord due regard to the pride and feelings of those before it.
Another consideration which should bear weight in most cases of
2Id. at 889. Also see Huntington Easy Payment Co. v. Parsons, 62 W. Va.
26, 57 S. E.253, 9 L. R. A. (x. s.) 113, 125 Am. St. Rep. 954 (1907) ; Davis v.
Lumber Co., 85 W. Va. 191, 101 S. E. 447 (1919).
3 Huntington Easy Payment Co. v. Parsons, 62 W. Va. 26, 57 S. E. 253
(1907); McCoRMICKx, DAMAGES (1935) § 159.
4Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285 (1875); Cooper v.
Stronge & W. Co., 111 Minn. 177, 126 N. W. 541, 27 L. R. A. (N. s.)1011,
20 Ann. Cas. 663 (1910); Williams v. Robinson, 158 Ark. 327, 250 S. W. 14,
28 A. L. R. 734 (1923), as to like employment; Emery v. Steckel, 126 Pa. 171,
17 AtI. 601, 12 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1889), as to "other employment of the
same or similar kinds".
GRESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 455, Comment d; Byrne v. Independent
School District, 139 Iowa 618, 117 N. W. 983 (1908).
6 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed.
322 (1926), discussing the interpretation of the word locality as used in a
statute dealing with wages paid in any locality, and stating " 'locality' means
place, near the place, vicinity, or neighborhood. These terms are elastic and,
dependent upon circumstances, may be equally satisfied by areas measured by
rods or miles." See James v. Board of Com'rs, 44 Ohio St. 226, 6 N. E. 246,
58 Am. Rep. 821 (1886), which by dictum seemingly limits locality to community.
7See 5 WIG oRE, EVIDENCE (1923) § 2580.
8 McCoRmicK, DAMAGES § 160; Americus Grocery Co. v. Roney, 129 Ga. 40,

58 S.E. 462 (1907).
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this type is the probability that any employment offered in lieu
of that denied by the breach of contract will be under conditions
less desirable to the wronged party, and fairness demands that one
should not be made to so act to his own disadvantage.
A. F. G.
ACT.-Action
act' by addeath
wrongful
the
under
for wrongful death brought
could take
who
distributees
no
left
ministrator of the deceased who
the disfor
the recovery in accordance with the statutes providing
2
tribution of estates of persons dying intestate. Held, that the lack
of beneficiaries was a good defense and that the recovery did not
escheat to the state. Two judges dissented on the ground that the
recovery should be allowed and should escheat to the state by a
strict interpretation of the wrongful death act and the distribution
3
statutes. Wilder v. Charleston Transit Company.
This case, in determining whether the recovery is a part of
the deceased's estate, throws further light on the nature of the
wrongful death act in West Virginia. If recovery is a part of the
estate, since there are no beneficiaries, it would escheat under the
distribution statutes. If it is not part of the estate, where there
are beneficiaries, it will be held in trust for them, and if there are
no beneficiaries, no recovery can be had.
4
The first wrongful death act in West Virginia specifically
provided that the recovery was for the benefit of the widow or
next of Idn of the deceased. The present act provides that the
recovery shall be distributed to the parties entitled under the
statutes providing for the distribution of the estates of persons
dying intestate. This would seem to show that the legislature's intent was to make the recovery a part of the deceased's estate. Another indication of this is to be found in the fact that the court
has allowed the jury to award punitive damages.' These damages
are not in the nature of compensation to the beneficiaries, but
rather are imposed on the defendant with the idea that he should
be penalized over and above the amount of the actual injury caused
by his wrongful act.
DA1AGES-REcOVERY UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH

1W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 55, art. 7, §§ 5, 6.

at c. 42, art. 2, §§ 1, 2.
3197 S. E. 814 (W. Va. 1938).
4 NV. Va. Acts 1863, c. 98.
rTurner v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 40 W. Va. 675, 22 S. E. 83 (1895).
2 Id.
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